Withdrawal of Remote Work Privileges by Employer Directive

Düsseldorf Labor Court, Judgment of 11 February 2026 – Case No. 3 Ca 6587/25

In its judgment of 11 February 2026 (Case No. 3 Ca 6587/25), the Düsseldorf Labor Court held that the employer’s directive requiring the claimant to perform his work on the employer’s premises from Monday to Thursday was invalid, as the employer had failed to demonstrate sufficiently that the attendance requirement complied with the standard of equitable discretion (billiges Ermessen).

A. Facts

The parties were in dispute over the validity of an employer directive under which the claimant was permitted to work off-site only on Fridays and was otherwise required to be present at the workplace.

The claimant has been employed by the defendant in the IT department since 1 April 2014 and had, until summer 2025, worked at least 50% of his working hours from home, particularly on Mondays and Fridays. In August 2025, the claimant’s next-level supervisor informed him by e-mail that “RA” (remote access) had been revoked until a release migration was “in the bag,” citing what the supervisor considered serious deficiencies in the department. The defendant pointed to significant organisational shortcomings, deficient project management in connection with an SAP release migration, communication and coordination problems, and what it perceived as leadership weaknesses on the part of the claimant. The claimant, by contrast, argued that there had been no reason to revoke his remote work privileges, that he had held a permanent authorisation, and that his remote work had in any event been agreed with his direct supervisor. He further relied on health and family circumstances, in particular rehabilitation and physiotherapy appointments as well as the distance between his residence and the workplace. The claimant initially sought permission to work 50% of his working hours from home; in the alternative, he requested permission to work from home on Mondays and Fridays for the duration of his rehabilitation programme, and additionally sought a declaratory judgment that the attendance directive was invalid.

B. Reasoning of the Düsseldorf Labor Court

The Düsseldorf Labor Court dismissed the claim for 50 % remote work as unfounded, holding that no such entitlement arose either from the employment contract or from the internal communication on “external working.”

In the court’s view, the communication on external working did not constitute a general undertaking (Gesamtzusage) because it contained neither an intention to be legally bound nor a sufficiently definite promise of performance. The court found it decisive that “external working” was described in the communication as a “privilege,” required the written approval of the supervisor, and merely set out framework conditions and upper limits. The court also rejected the existence of an established workplace practice (betriebliche Übung), reasoning that the claimant had essentially only described his previous de facto remote work arrangements, from which no declaration of intent by the employer to grant a lasting entitlement could be inferred. The court likewise declined to find that the employer’s right of direction (Direktionsrecht) had crystallised in the claimant’s favour, as a long-standing practice alone was insufficient and additional circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation of the continuation of particular working conditions were required.

The court did not consider the principle of equal treatment under employment law to provide a basis for the claim, as the claimant had not sufficiently demonstrated any arbitrary differentiation vis-à-vis comparable employees.

The court held the alternative claim for remote work on Mondays and Fridays for the duration of the rehabilitation programme to be inadmissible, as the time period, conditions, and end of the sought permission had not been sufficiently specified by the claimant.

The declaratory claim against the specific directive to work on the employer’s premises from Monday to Thursday was, however, successful. While the court acknowledged in principle that the employer may determine the place of work pursuant to Section 106 of the Industrial Code (GewO) and that this right of direction is subject to judicial review only as to compliance with equitable discretion, the employer bore the burden of presentation and proof that its directive satisfied the standard of equitable discretion. In the court’s view, the defendant had failed to explain in a comprehensible manner why the claimant’s presence at the workplace would be capable of remedying the alleged organisational deficiencies, communication problems, or performance shortfalls. In particular, the court was not persuaded that the claimant’s physical presence could improve communication when key contacts continued to work remotely and communication channels therefore remained unchanged. The court therefore characterised the measure as the withdrawal of a privilege or a form of sanction rather than a comprehensibly justified organisational measure.

In the absence of a sufficient nexus between the attendance requirement and the operational objective pursued, the directive was defective in the exercise of discretion and therefore invalid.

C. Practical Note

The decision demonstrates that remote work policies do not automatically give rise to an individual entitlement to remote work where the policy merely sets out framework conditions, upper limits, and approval requirements.

Employers should therefore clearly articulate whether a remote work policy merely establishes an approval-dependent framework or is intended to create an enforceable entitlement. When revoking or restricting remote work arrangements that have already been practised, it is insufficient to make a general reference to organisational deficiencies, communication problems, or the need for oversight. Rather, employers should document specifically why the ordered physical presence is suitable and necessary to achieve the stated operational objectives.

For employees, it is significant that a general claim to a specific scope of remote work may be harder to enforce than a targeted declaratory claim that a specific attendance directive is defective in the exercise of discretion.